Washington International Law Journal
Volume 4
Number 1 Competition and Trade Policy:
Europe, Japan and the United States
3-1-1995

A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the
International Harmonization of Competition Law
Hiroshi Iyori

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International Harmonization of
Competition Law, 4 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 59 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol4/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright 0 1995 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association

A COMPARISON OF U.S.-JAPAN ANTITRUST LAW:
LOOKING AT THE INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
OF COMPETITION LAW
Hiroshi Iyorit
Abstract: This article focuses on the legislative history of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law and a comparison between the substantive provisions of the Japanese
law and its U.S. origins. It begins with a historical overview of the fundamental differences between the economies of Japan and the U.S., as well as Japan through the postwar
period and the contrasting contexts in which competition laws were enacted in each
country. It offers a brief outline of the historical development of Japanese competition
law, from the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law through amendments and defining
The article then focuses on coverage, sanctions, and
judicial interpretations.
interpretation, particularly in the treatment of vertical price-fixing and other vertical
restraints. The comparative problem of keiretsu and their treatment under U.S. and
Japanese competition law is also addressed. The article concludes with a series of recommendations for reform of Japanese law and practice designed to promote greater
international harmonization.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As reductions of import restrictions and tariff rates have continued
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, international
competition and economic friction between countries, particularly the
industrial states, has intensified. Trade friction between Japan and the U.S.
began in the 1960s with the rapid increase in Japan's export of textiles,
steel, and color televisions. In each case, the dispute was resolved by
Japan's adoption of voluntary export restrictions. However, the friction
intensified in the 1970s and continued through the 1980s as the U.S. became
dissatisfied with the closed nature of the Japanese market and the corresponding limits placed on the growth of U.S. exports. During the U.S.Japan Structural Impediments Initiative ("SII") talks, the U.S. urged Japan
to adopt policies to stimulate domestic demand. Various government
restrictions, exclusionary business practices, and the keiretsu organizational
structure, were also identified as barriers to market entry. In order to solve

these problems, the U.S. demanded that Japan strengthen its Antimonopoly
Law. In the aftermath of the SII negotiations, Japan's Antimonopoly Law
was strengthened considerably.
As business becomes more international, antitrust laws will continue
to constitute the legal foundation of the market economy. When a country
has closed markets, what generally follows are demands by consumers and
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trading partners to strengthen the country's antitrust laws and relax accesslimiting government regulations. Often, the larger the country's market in
the international arena, the more force this demand will carry. Antitrust
laws provide the rules that regulate the conditions of economic competition.
If there is an important difference between the antitrust laws of any two
countries, the result will be a difference in the actual conditions of competition and market participation. There will likewise be a demand to
harmonize both of their antitrust laws. Moreover, this demand for
harmonization will likely not be limited to competition policies. For
example, environmental and intellectual property issues were as important
as competition regulations in the post Uruguay Round of the GATT, and
both have become important themes in international harmonization.
The closed nature of the Japanese market and the differences between
the antitrust laws of Japan and those of the U.S. have emerged as critical
trade issues. It is important to consider the results of these differences, how
they arose, and what can be learned from them. This article examines U.S.Japan antitrust laws and explores the differences in restrictions and methods
of restriction. 1
Japan's Antimonopoly Law2 was enacted in 1947 under the strong
influence of U.S. antitrust laws. Although these laws continue to share
many fundamental similarities, considerable differences have developed
over time. This article touches on the ideological, social, and historical
factors that have greatly influenced the development of both Japanese and
U.S. antitrust law. European Union ("EU") competition law will also be
examined.

I For a general comparison of United States and Japanese antitrust law, see MATSUSHITA MITSUO,
AMERIKA DOKUSEN KINSHI HO [AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW] (1982); MURAKAMI MASAHIRO, DOKUSEN
KINSHI HO NICHIBEI HIKAKU [COMPARISON OF U.S.-JAPAN ANTiMONOPOLY LAW] (1991); Hiroshi lyori, A
Comparative Analysis of Japanese Competition Law, in DIE JAPANISIERUNG DES WESTLICHEN RECHTS

(Coing et al. eds., 1989); Harry First, Antitrust Law in the United States and Japan: A Comparative. Essay
(1993) (unpublished paper). For a comparison of Japanese and German competition law, see John 0.
Haley, Antitrust Sanctionsand Remedies: A ComparativeStudy of German and Japanese Law, 59 WASH.
L. REV. 471 (1984).
2 Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi k6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Protection of Fair Trade), Law No. 54 of 1947 [hereinafter
Antimonopoly Law].
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II.

EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN JAPAN

A.

Differences in the Japanese and the United States Economies and
Their Background

1.

The United States: HistoricalOverview

In the 17th century, North America was colonized by West European
immigrants. The United States of America was formed at the end of the
18th century. It was a new nation of immigrants with an ideological
heritage based on Puritan notions of freedom, individualism, and
democracy. These ideas became the fundamental principles of the nation
during its revolutionary birth. The founders criticized centralization of
political, social, and economic power, and segregated relations between
government and business. They valued individual freedom and free
competition which lay at the foundation of 17th century English common
law in "the rule of illegal restraints on trade" and "the rule of illegal
monopolies" which were incorporated into U.S. law. By the end of the 19th
century, agreements restraining trade or monopolistic activity had been
invalidated under the common law.
Nevertheless, monopolistic practices increased in the late nineteenth
century after the industrial revolution. In response, the Sherman Act of
18903 codified the common law rules restricting monopolies, imposed fines
for restraints of trade and monopolistic activity, and allowed the use of
cease and desist orders. The Act became the legal foundation for the private
free enterprise system.
More than two decades later, the Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914 prohibited unfair methods of competition. It established the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") as an independent regulatory agency outside
the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and made the FTC responsible for enforcing antitrust law. Finally, the Clayton Act of 19144
augmented the Sherman Act by prohibiting actions that restrained
competition, such as price discrimination, tied sales, and stock acquisitions.
Furthermore, it introduced punitive damages of three times the amount of
actual harm to result from violations of the antitrust laws. From the
Depression Era to the end of World War II, U.S. policy favored strong anti3 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1988)).
4 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
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trust enforcement. Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt supported strengthening the
application of the U.S. antitrust laws. Accordingly, in 1941, the Temporary
National Economic Committee of Congress recommended various
proposals to strengthen the antitrust laws. The creation of the Bretton
Woods GATT system and the promotion of a system of international free
trade after World War II marked the high point of U.S. antitrust policy.
During this period, U.S. forces occupied and ruled Japan and enacted
Japan's Antimonopoly Law premised on an American-style market
economy system.
2.

Japan: HistoricalOverview

Japan, as an island nation, has had a roughly homogeneous
population since its inception in the 4th century. It has a strong Confucian
influence and a tendency to value group harmony and order, but also a
strong tradition of being open to foreign cultures. The economic structure
has generally been conservative, but examples exist of unrestricted
openness, such as the 16th century rakuichi rakuza policies under Oda
Nobunaga (1534-1562) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), which
abolished guilds and eliminated local customs barriers and market fees.
Although regionalism existed during the Edo Period (1615-1867), a national
distribution market was maintained, and in the Meiji Period (1867-1912), a
strong policy of openness and Westernization was adopted.
The concept of a market economy and economic freedom was
initially introduced during the Meiji Restoration along with the introduction
of classical economic theory. The idea that free competition would promote
the public welfare was widely held.5 The Meiji government built the
foundation for a modem Western legal system, and treaties with Western
nations opened the Japanese market to competition from the West. Until
World War I, Japanese import restrictions were not allowed and import
tariffs were kept below five percent. However, in order to catch up with the
Western powers, the Meiji government adopted a policy of managing the
economy for the promotion of industry using the slogans "Rich country,
strong army" and "Promote industries and increase production." During
this period there was a close relationship between government and business.
5 Sugihara Shir6, Jiyiishugi to rekishigakuha, [LiberalismandHistoricalSchool], in KINDAI NIHON
KEIZAI SHIS0SH1 [HISTORY OF MODERN JAPANESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT] (Ch

eds., 1969).

Satchio & Sumiya Kazahiko
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Given the strong tendency in Japan to think in terms of the group, cartels
were considered to benefit the public welfare and were legalized. 6
During the recession following World War I, the government increased market intervention and officially recognized and strengthened
cartels. In addition to the Important Industries Control Law of 1931,
various other enterprise and industry laws were enacted, before the National
General Mobilization Law of 1938 placed the Japanese economy under
centralized control.
The process of social and economic democratization, beginning after
World War II, included labor and agricultural land reforms. The Supreme
Commander for Allied Powers ("SCAP") repealed the laws fostering centralized control of the economy, and vigorously dismantled the zaibatsu and
other excessive concentrations of economic power. However, the actual
government policy for economic development after the war was similar to
the centrally managed system employed before and during the war.
Shortages of materials after the war were transitionally managed by the
Temporary Materials Supply and Demand Adjustment Law.7 Operating
under a policy of centralized resource management, the economic ministries
rationed basic materials and capital. Thus, the structure of the economic
ministries continued basically as under the Wartime Materials Mobilization
Plan of 1938.8 During this period, almost no one responsible for
implementing government policy other than the FTC considered the benefits of a market economy system based on free competition. The actual
economy created after the war was a complicated mix, including elements
of both a free market economy and centrally managed economy. This
legacy played an important role in the development of antitrust policy in
Japan.

6 Matsushita Mitsuo & Okada Totsuhiro, Dokkihhj ihan o meguru minji sosh5 ni kansuru hanrei
bunseki [Analysis ofJudicialPrecedentsConcerningCivil Suits Involving Antimonopoly Violations], NBL,
Nos. 453,354, 356, 370, 371 (1986-87); lyori, supranote 1, at 228-29.
7 See KOSEI TORIHIKI I'INKAI, DOKUSEN KINSHI SEISAKU 30 NENSHI [30 YEAR HISTORY OF

ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY] 16-32 (1977).
8 See SH6K0 GYOSEISHI KANK6KAI [COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
PROMOTION SOCIETY], 2 SHOK6 GYOSEISHI [COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY POLICY HISTORY] (1955). In an
essay in the November 1993 issue of the Asahi Monthly [Gekkan Asahij, Yukio Noguchi argues that it is
necessary to destroy the residual elements he refers to as the "1940 system" - the administrative
organization, financial, and agriculture production control systems which were established during World
War II and continued into the postwar period.
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B.

Japan'sInheritedAntimonopoly Law

1.

Details of the Enactment of the Antimonopoly Law

Japan's Antimonopoly Law was enacted under the unilateral
influence of the United States in connection with the economic
democratization policy. SCAP proposed:
enacting a law that dismantles or prohibits private monopolies,
restraints of trade, and undesirable interlocking directorates or
holding companies, separates banks from their strong influence
over trade, industry, and agriculture, and provides an equal
opportunity for competition among participants in trade,
industry, agriculture, and finance. 9
Based on this memorandum, the government launched an inquiry into the
enactment of the Antimonopoly Law.
In January of 1946, the Planning section of the General Affairs
Department of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, later to become the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"), drafted an Industry
Structure Bill. This bill proposed: 1) restricting unfair trade practices; 2)
systematizing notification for cartel agreements; and 3) regulating cartel
abuses and important external restrictions. SCAP rejected the bill as it
resembled the prewar Important Industries Control Law which strengthened
cartels.
In July 1946, Judge P.T. Kime of the SCAP Antitrust and Cartel
Division proposed a "tentative plan dealing with the promotion and support
of free and fair dealing." In response, in November 1946, the cabinet
created the Antimonopoly Law Study Committee which prepared the
Antimonopoly System Report in December. On March 12, 1947, after negotiations with SCAP, the Antimonopoly Act Bill was presented to the Diet.
It passed on March 31 during the last session of the Imperial Diet under the
Meiji Constitution.
As it became clear that trade associations were in a position to control
their members, the Trade Association Law was enacted in December of
1948 to supplement the Antimonopoly Law. It contained severe provisions
restricting the activities of trade associations. This antitrust regime aimed to
9

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS, MEMORANDUM (Nov. 6, 1945) Item 6-C.
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establish a market economy system in Japan. Except for the economic
democratization policy of SCAP, which received some support by scholars,
the Japanese government did not have a competition policy comparable to
that of the German government, influenced by Ordo-liberalism.
2.

The Contents of the 1947 Antimonopoly Law

a.

Main Provisions

As enacted in 1947, the Antimonopoly Law: 1) prohibited private
monopolies, domestic and international concerted action and
anticompetitive agreements, unreasonable disparities in enterprise strength
(futo na jigyo no ryoku no kakusa), and the formation of private control

associations and holding companies; 2) restricted interlocking directorates,
mergers, stockholding by financial companies, ownership of corporate debt,
and the transfer of management between companies; 3) empowered the
government to issue cease and desist orders against entrepreneurs for
violations of the law, and to impose fines against economic actors and
juridical persons; 4) allowed exemptions for small scale trade associations;
and 5) established the Fair Trade Commission ("FTC") as an independent
commission charged with applying the Antimonopoly Law.
The 1948 Trade Association Law divided trade association activities
into three categories:
prohibited activities, permitted activities, and
approved activities. The statute included detailed regulations for controlling
each category, and imposed a notification requirement on trade associations.
b.

Comparisonwith the Kime Proposal

The wording of the 1947 Antimonopoly Law was different from that
of the Kime Proposal, but the content was very similar. Both included
provisions to deal with unreasonable disparities in enterprise strength and
exemptions for small scale trade associations. The Kime Proposal covered
"any person" (nanibito mo) (as in U.S. law), initially established fines for
illegal activity, and included a provision for triple damages. Furthermore,
parent corporations were to be made responsible for the actions of their
subsidiaries, a section which applied generally to foreign corporations.
There was no provision prohibiting the establishment of holding companies,
but corporate stock holding was almost entirely forbidden. Finally, the
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Kime Proposal suggested a three member enforcement committee (Kosei
Kanko linkai) be established under the Chairman and Vice-Minister of the
Ministry of Justice.
c.

Comparisonwith the U.S. law

The Antimonopoly Law as enacted was stricter than U.S. antitrust
laws. It not only included regulations contained in U.S. antitrust statutes
and caselaw but also incorporated influential theories and recommendations
from the aforementioned Temporary National Economic Committee.
Japan's law was more stringent than U.S. law in its: 1) strict regulation of
international agreements; 2) its uniform restrictions against corporate stock
holding, ownership of debt, interlocking directorates, mergers; and 3) its
regulation of unreasonable disparities in enterprise strength. Especially
notable was the method of requiring approval for international agreements
and corporate stockholding and mergers. A notification system for corporate stock ownership and mergers exceeding an established limit was not
introduced in the U.S. until 1976. Moreover, U.S. law does not yet contain
restrictions or filing requirements designed to control trade associations or
international agreements.
d.

The 1949 Amendments

The restrictions that were more severe in Japan than in the U.S. e.g., restrictions on international agreements, corporate stock holding,
ownership of debt, and mergers - became impediments to the introduction
of U.S. capital into Japan. This difficulty was mitigated with the 1949
amendments to the Antimonopoly Law, which relaxed the stockholding
restriction, replaced the prior approval requirements with a notification
system, and brought the Antimonopoly Act closer in alignment with U.S.
practice.
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3.

The 1953 Amendments to the Antimonopoly Law and Labor
Developments

a.

The situationafter the occupation

In April 1952, the Occupation ended and the Peace Treaty came into
effect. Occupation laws and policies, including the Antimonopoly Law,
were reexamined. Government ministries in charge of economic policy had
little understanding of the relationship between the Antimonopoly Law and
the market system. During the recession which followed the Korean War,
there were demands to relax the Antimonopoly Law and to enact an
Antimonopoly Exemption Act, which the FTC resisted. The argument for
relaxing the Antimonopoly Act was that Japan, unlike the U.S., was a small
country poor in resources, and therefore could not entrust economic
management to free competition. In 1952, the Export Transaction Law was
passed to allow export cartels. Also, the Small and Medium Sized
Enterprise Stabilization Law was passed to allow cartels among small and
medium sized enterprises.
b.

The 1953 amendments to the Antimonopoly Law

In 1952, the West German Bundestag considered a bill for a
competition law. This bill included exemptions for various cartels,
including depression cartels, rationalization cartels, and export cartels. The
1953 amendments to the Japanese Antimonopoly Law provided for similar
exemptions to permit depression and rationalization cartels. In addition, the
amendments deleted regulation of activities that only slightly affected
competition, preventative regulations, and regulation of unreasonable
disparities in enterprise strength. At the same time, the Trade Association
Act was repealed and the regulation of conduct creating "substantial
restraints of trade in particular areas of trade" was shifted into the
Antimonopoly Law.
c.

Industrialpolicy

Japan's principal economic ministries were able to allocate money for
industrial development and control foreign currency under the 1949 Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act. Through these means, they

MAR.

1995

A COMPARISON OF U.S.-JAPANANTITRUST LA W

69

fostered the development of basic industries. After the 1952 depression, the
ministries, especially MITI, began to implement an industrial policy which
restricted competition. Restrictions included enactments of exemption laws
and production curtailment recommendations (kankoku soan). Subsequent
to the 1953 Amendment which weakened the Antimonopoly Law, the FTC
began to enforce competition policy through a compromise with the
economic ministries. They tacitly consented to use restrictive informal
guidance, avoiding further relaxation of the Antimonopoly Law and
enactment of exemption laws.
However, after a series of blows to monopolistic practices, the FTC
began to actively enforce the Antimonopoly Law, and industrial policy
makers gradually began to appreciate antimonopoly policy. A proposal to
further weaken the Antimonopoly Law failed in the Diet in 1958. In 1959,
measures liberalizing trade were implemented. From about 1960, cartel
regulations were strengthened according to price policy, while consumer
policy was improved and market economic policy was diffused.
d.

The 1977 amendment andrecent trends

In 1977, the Antimonopoly Law was further strengthened by the
introduction of a surcharge system and other measures. These measures
were designed to counter price increases and other forms of abusive conduct
of big business associated with the oil crises. A second factor which helped
to bolster the Antimonopoly Law was the U.S.-Japan Structural
Impediments Initiative talks in 1991.
C.

Differences in InterpretationofAnticompetitive Agreements

1.

Issues

Agreements that restrict competition are the most relevant to the
closed market customs (sizyo heisateki kanko) which were discussed in the
U.S.-Japan SII talks. Under Japan's Antimonopoly Law, the basic
provisions that prohibit anticompetitive agreements are article 3 and former
article 4. Both of these provisions correspond to section 1 of the Sherman
Act's prohibition against "restraints of trade." Article 3 prohibits
"unreasonable restraints of trade" and former article 4 prohibited "concerted
practices." Article 4 was repealed under the 1953 amendments.
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Article 2 paragraph 6 of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law defines an
"unreasonable restraint of trade" as "any entrepreneur [who], by contract,
agreement or any other concerted action, irrespective of other names, with
other entrepreneurs, mutually [restricts] or [conducts] their business
activities." Former article 4 defined "concerted practices" as "entrepreneurs
[who] jointly fix, maintain or increase prices" (paragraph 1), but it provided
that "[this article] does not apply in case the affect of such concerted
activities on competition within a particular field of trade is negligible."
(paragraph 2). The definition of "unreasonable restraint of trade" under
article 2 paragraph 6 was construed as being the same as "concerted
practices" under former article 4. The difference between article 3 and
former article 4 was thought to lie in the degree of the effect on competition
required. Many FTC decisions applied both of these provisions.10
In comparison, section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is deemed to be illegal." Under U.S. law, concerted actions "in
restraint of trade or commerce" are regulated, but under the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, concerted activities that "substantially restrict
competition in a particular field of trade contrary to the public interest" are
regulated.
2.

VerticalAgreements

Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies not only to horizontal
agreements that restrict competition, but also to restrictive vertical
agreements. I Similarly, under the competition law of the EU, Article 85 of
the Treaty of Rome regulates both restrictive horizontal and vertical
agreements.
In Japan, early FTC decisions applied article 3 and former article 4, as
well as article 6 which prohibits international agreements that contain
10 Bank Interest Agreement Case, Judgment of Dec. 22, 1947 (Teikoku Gink6), FTC [decision] no.
1, 1947, 1 Shinketsushfi 1; Plywood Bidding Agreement Case, Judgment of Aug. 30, 1949, (Yuasa
Mokuzai Kgy6 K.K.) FTC [decision] no. 2, 1948, 1 Shinketsushi 62 [hereinafter Plywood Bidding
Agreement Case]; Butter Price Agreement Case, Judgment of Sept. 18, 1950, (Hokkaido Butter K.K.), FTC
[decision] no. 78, 1950, 2 Shinketsushii 103; Phonetic Record Price Agreement Case, Judgment of Oct. 5,
1951 (Nihon Columbia K.K.), FTC [decision] no. 5, 1951, 3 Shinketsushii 107; Soy Sauce Price
Agreement Case, Judgment of Dec. 25, 1957 (Noda Sh6yu K.K. v. K6sei Torihiki linkai), Tokyo K6sai
[High Court], 9 ShinketsushFi 57 [hereinafter Soy Sauce Price Agreement Case].
11 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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provisions listed in *former article 4 paragraph 1, to vertical agreements.12
However, in a March 1953 decision on appeal from an FTC decision
concerning the agreement in the Newspaper Distribution Area Case
(shinbun hanro kyrteifiken), the Tokyo High Court held that neither article
3 nor former article 4 was applicable to a vertical agreement, because a
vertical agreement was not a "concerted practice." Vertical agreements are

regulated under article 15 as contracts that purport to bind a third party
(daisanhakdsoku keiyaku). Although there is much scholarly criticism of
this decision, 13 the Japanese FTC no longer applies article 3 to vertical
restraints, and instead treats anticompetitive vertical agreements as unfair
trade practices under article 19.14 This decision can best be understood
against the background of the prewar conception of cartels as focusing on
raw materials (seisanzai). Similarly, under German law, article 1 of the
1957 Law Against Restraints on Competition, which prohibits cartels, is
applied only to horizontal agreements.
It is appropriate to include vertical agreements as "unreasonable
restraints of trade" protected under article 3 for several reasons. In real
consumer goods distribution transactions (shohizai ryutsu torihiki), vertical
and horizontal agreements are intertwined in a complicated manner.
Vertical agreements such as unreasonable keiretsu transactions (futo na
keiretsu torihiki) are included in closed market customs (shifo heisa teki na

12 Marukin Sh6yu Int'l Contract Case, Judgment of Mar. 20, 1950 (Marukin Sh~yu K.K.), FTC
[decision] no. 19, 1949, 1 Shinketsushii 129; Butter Price Agreement Case, Judgment of Sept. 18, 1950,
(Hokkaido Butter K.K.), FTC [decision] no. 78, 1950, 2 Shinketsush0i 103; Cosmetics Price Agreement
Case, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1994 (Honten v. Shinseido Tokyo Hantai K.K.), Tokyo K6sai [High Court],
1507 HANJI 43 (reversing Judgment of Sept. 27, 1993, Tokyo Chisai [District Court]); Newspaper Sales
Territory Agreement Case, Judgment of Mar. 9, 1953 (Asahi Shimbunsha v. K6sei Torihiki I'inkai), Tokyo
K~sai [High Court], 6 K6minshfi 435, 4 Shinketsushfi 145; Phonetic Record Price Agreement Case,
Judgment of Oct. 5, 1951 (Nihon Columbia K.K.), FTC [decision] no. 5, 1951, 3 Shinketsushii 107.
Article 19 was also applied in the International Contract Cases.
13 Fukumitsu leyoshi, Tate no ketsugi ni yoru torihikiseigen [VerticalAgreements as Restraints of
Trade], 5 KOBE HOGAKU ZASSHI, nos. 1, 2 (Oct. 1955). Opponents of the decision include Professors I.
Fukumitsu, S. Imamura, A. Tans&, A Shrda and M. Matsushita. Professor Yoshio Kanazawa is a supporter
who had criticized the earlier FTC decision before the Tokyo High Court decision.
14 Taish5 Pharmaceutical Case, Judgment of Dec. 10, 1955 (Taish6 Seiyaku K.K.), FTC
[recommendation] no. 3, 1955, 7 Shinketsush0i 99; Nihon Suisan Case, Judgment of Nov. 7, 1964 (Nihon
Suisan K.K.), FTC [recommendation] no. 6, 1965, 13 Shinketsushfi 146; Ka5 Sekken Case (1965),
Judgment of May 20, 1965, FTC [recommendation] no. 6, 1965, 13 Shinketsushci 14; Meiji Shoji Case
(1971), Judgment of Oct 11, 1968, FTC [decision] no. 1, 1966, 15 Shinketsushii 67, aff'd onfirst appeal
(kgkoku), Judgment of July 17, 1971 (Meiji Shoji K.K. v. FTC), Tokyo K~sai [High Court], 18
Shinketsush0i 167, affid on second appeal Oikoku), Judgment of July 11, 1975, Saik6sai [Supreme Court],
29 Minshia 951.
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kanko). Moreover, article 3 was enacted specifically to regulate all kinds of
agreements that artificially restrict competition.
Although it is possible to regulate vertical agreements under article
19 as unfair trade practices, the only sanction available is a cease and desist
order. No surcharge or criminal penalties can be applied. Since vertical
agreements have the same restricting effect on competition as horizontal
agreements, sanctions such as a surcharge and criminal penalties should be
adopted to completely eradicate and prevent vertical agreements.
In its Guidelines of July 1991, the Japanese FTC indicated its belief
that vertical agreements could be included as "unreasonable restraints of
trade" under article 3. The Guidelines state: "The content of restrictions of
business activities in this context does not need to be identical in all firms
(for example, distributors and manufacturers), but is sufficient if the
conduct restricts the business activities of each firm and is for the purpose
of achieving a common purpose, such as the exclusion of any specific
firm."' 5 The Guidelines also indicated the FTC's intention to treat
concerted boycotts (kyodo boycott) barring market entry (shio san' nyu),
which had been dealt with as unfair trade practices, as unreasonable
restraints on trade. As the guideline stated: Because these boycotts
"[result] in substantial restraint of competition in the market, such conduct
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade and violates article 3 of the
Antimonopoly Act."16
3.

ConcertedActions (Agreements) and Proof

Anticompetitive agreements are agreements among competitors to
restrict competition. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, anticompetitive
agreements are prohibited under the rubric of "every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce."
The existence of such agreements may be based on
circumstantial evidence. In Interstate Circuit,Inc. v. United States,17 the
United State Supreme Court held:

15 FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION AND TRADING PRACTIcES 13-

14(1991).
16 Id.
at 11.
17 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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In many cases, competitors / parties do not
(i)
formally agree, and if proof of the execution of a formal
agreement is required, the enforcement of the antitrust laws is
unreasonably limited;
(ii) If a concerted action which is unnatural as a matter
of the course of events, and which cannot be justified by prior
or following circumstances was conducted in addition to other
circumstances, such a concerted action can constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws; and
(iii) If competitors hold a meeting with the intention to
restrict competition, such a meeting may be a per se violation
of antitrust laws.
However, mere conscious parallelism does not constitute a violation
of the antitrust laws. 18 In addition, circumstantial evidence is required to
prove the violation of antitrust law.
In the European Union, concerted practices are regulated. Contracts
and implied agreements are included among prohibited concerted practices.
The requirements for proof are almost the same as those in the United
States. 19

In Japan, a concerted action under article 3 and former article 4 is
interpreted as an implied agreement or mutual communication of intention.
The existence of such implied agreement or mutual communication of
intention can be proven by circumstantial evidence. The Japanese FTC
held, in its decision of August 1949 regarding a plywood sheet bid rigging
agreement, 20 that in order to constitute concerted action, the fact that there
is the appearance of identical acts is not sufficient. In addition to such
appearance, mutual communication of the parties must exist." The FTC
similarly found concerted action in its decision of December 195521
regarding a price-fixing agreement in an oil products bid. The Tokyo High
Court supported this FTC decision in its opinion of February 1956. It held
that "it is obvious that we can reasonably find the same facts regarding
18 Theater Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
19 See, e.g., Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, 18 E.C.R. 619, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 (1972).
20 Judgment of Aug. 30, 1949 (FTC v. Yuasa Mokuzai K6gy6 K.K.), FTC [decision] no. 2, 1948, 1
ShinketsushOi 62.
21 Judgment of Dec. 1, 1955 (FTC v. Nihon Sekiyu K.K.), FTC [decision] no. 1, 1953, 7
Shinketsushfi 70; af'don appeal, Judgment of Feb. 9, 1956 (Nihon Sekiyu K.K. v. K6sei Torihiki rinkai),
Tokyo Kasai [High Court], 7 Gyashii 2949.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 4 No. I

price-fixing agreement as the FTC's decision if we examine the evidence
listed in the FTC's decision as a whole. Therefore, the fact finding of the
defendant does not conflict with reasonable inference." 22 This Japanese
decision is not so far from that of U.S. antitrust law. However, the mere
existence of exchanged price information does not guarantee that the FTC
will find price-fixing. In the FTC decision of July 28, 1994, regarding an
elevator maintenance agreement, the FTC denied the proof of agreement
despite the existence of a mutual exchange of price information.
4.

ParticularFieldof Trade

While in the U.S., concerted actions "in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" are regulated
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, in Japan, concerted actions that
"substantially restrict competition in a particular field of trade" are
prohibited as an "unreasonable restraint of trade" under article 3 of the
Antimonopoly Law. In Japan, it is particularly unnecessary to discuss the
term "among the several States, or with foreign nations." This phrase is
included because of the Sherman Act's status as federal law. The Sherman
Act does not contain the clause "a particular field of trade." "A particular
field of trade" is interpreted in Japan as a market in which the competition is
restricted. Considering that section 1 of the Sherman Act is interpreted not
to protect competitors but to protect competition, I do not think that there is
any difference between it and the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. In the case
of anticompetitive agreements, because a restricted trade or market is
identified and specified by such agreements, further identification of a trade
or a market by the concept of "a particular field of trade" is meaningless.
However, if a "particular field of trade" under the provision of an
"unreasonable restraint of trade" is given its own definition beyond the
aforementioned meaning and is considered to be an independent
requirement, it is possible that the scope of an "unreasonable restraint of
trade" is significantly narrowed and that the regulation thereof would be
restricted.
It should be noted that even though the term "a particular field of
trade" under article 3 (unreasonable restraints of trade) and the term "a
particular field of trade" under article 15 (merger control) are the same, their
22 Judgment of Feb. 9, 1956 (Nihon Sekiyu K.K. v. Kasei Torihiki I'inkai), Tokyo K~sai [High
Court], 7 Gy6shil 2949.
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function and meaning are quite different. For example, in the case of
corporate mergers, the issues to be considered are what field of trade is
affected and how this field is affected. Fields of trade correspond to the
kinds of products handled by such companies and the geographical area of
their business activities. In this case, the definition of the term "a particular
field of trade" has extremely significant meaning. It is inappropriate,
therefore, in terms of the nature of regulated activities and the intentions of
the legislators, to interpret the term "a particular field of trade" in cases of
"unreasonable restraints of trade" in the same manner as "unreasonable
If we do not
restraints of trade" in the provision of merger control.
recognize these points and interpret "a particular field of trade" as a separate
requirement, the regulation of activities that constitute unreasonable
restraints of trade become substantially restricted. If we appropriately
interpret "a particular field of trade," as the transactions that are subject to
the agreement, there is no difference between the U.S. and Japanese law.
However, in Japan this point had not been made clear by court decisions or
23
academic discussion.
5.

SubstantialRestriction on Competition

The anticompetitive agreements which are regulated are agreements
that restrict competition. Under U.S. law, such regulated agreements are
characterized as agreements "in restraint of trade and commerce" while
under Japanese law, they are agreements that "substantially restrict
competition." What then are the differences between agreements "in
restraint of trade and commerce" and agreements that "substantially restrict
competition?"
In the United States, interpretations of the term "restraint of trade"
differ according to the type of conduct subject to the restraint. Thus,
interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman Act for restrictive activities to
which the "per se illegal" rule applies are significantly different from those
applied to activities to which the "rule of reason" applies. The former
would be applied to activities such as price-fixing agreements, while the
latter would be applied to activities such as agreements on standardization.

23 See lyori
Hiroshi, I Mei no torihiki bunya ni okeru kygs5 no jisshitsuteki seigen no kaishaku
[Interpretation of Substantial Restraint in a Particular Field of Trade], in IMAMURA TAIKANKINEN
RONBUNSHU: KOHOTOKEIZAI HC NOSHOMONDAI 11(1982) [hereinafter I Mei no torihikl.
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In StandardOil Co. v. United States,24 the U.S. Supreme Court held

that under section 1 of the Sherman Act, an agreement should be regulated
only when it unreasonably restricts trade, but that certain agreements are
presumed to be unreasonable based on their nature and character. With
respect to those restrictions to which the rule of reason is applicable, the
Court has examined in separate opinions whether the purpose and effects of
the restriction favor competition, 25 whether the party concerned has market
power or a meaningful market share, 26 and whether the restriction of trade
will result in a present or future benefit to the market or to competition. 27
On the contrary, applications of the "per se illegal" rule do not
consider effects on the market or on competition. In United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Co.,28 the Court held that price-fixing agreements among
competitors are illegal under any circumstances. It also determined that
application of the per se illegal rule does not require analysis as to whether
actual competition still exists in the market, whether prices become uniform
because of cartel activities, whether the uniform price was created directly
or indirectly, or whether the purpose of such restraint is to prevent
destructive competition. Thus, regardless of the relative market power or
market share of competitors, agreements on price are per se violations.
In the EU, Article 85 paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all
anticompetitive agreements or concerted activities which have an
appreciable effect on the market.29 The EU Commission has ruled that only
agreements among small and medium size undertakings with a five percent
or less market share are permissible. 30 On the other hand, agreements that
contribute to restructuring of economic processes and that do not restrict
effective competition are allowed under Article 85 paragraph 3. In this,
Article 85 paragraph 3 corresponds to the "rule of reason" in the U.S. In
Germany, article 1 of the Law Against Restraints of Competition ("GWB")
prohibits cartels and applies to agreements among competitors even if their
total market share is five percent or less. 31
24 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

25 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
26 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
27 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, (1977).
28 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

29 Judgment of May 1969 (Volk v. Vervaecke), 1969 C.M.L.R. 273.
30 Notice regarding de minims rule in September of 1986.
31 Judgment of Oct. 27, 1966 (Bockhorner Klinker Case), Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court],
Wuw/E BGH 726, 730.
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Prior to the 1953 amendments of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
former article 4 paragraph 1 prohibited concerted actions. Former article 4
paragraph 2, however, provided that such a prohibition was not applicable
to concerted actions with only a de minimis effect on competition in a
particular field of trade. These provisions were almost the same as those in
effect in the U.S. and the EU. In the period immediately following the
passage of the 1953 amendments, article 3 was construed in a manner
basically similar to former article 4 paragraph 2 when considering the
effects on competition of concerted actions which substantially restrict
competition in a particular field of trade.
Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, the same term, "substantially
restricts competition in a particular field of trade," which is used in the
provision on the prohibition of unreasonable restraints of trade, 32 also
appears in: 1) the provisions prohibiting private monopolies; 33 2) the
restrictions against stockholding by companies; 3 4 3) the restrictions against
36
interlocking directorates; 35 4) the provisions for regulation of mergers;
and 5) the restrictions on acquisitions of businesses. 37 In this respect
Japanese law differs from both U.S. and European competition law. In the
U.S., significantly different rules of interpretation ("the rule of reason" and
the "per se illegal" rule) have been adopted, depending on the types of
activities involved. In Japan, however, it seems that the term "substantially
restricts competition in a particular field of trade," is interpreted uniformly
despite differences in the types of regulation. For example, in a case under
article 16 where a lease of facilities was found to be equivalent to a merger,
the Tokyo High Court held that "substantial restriction of competition"
means "situations in which competition is lessened and a particular
entrepreneur or a group of entrepreneurs can control the market, freely
controlling to a certain extent conditions such as price, quality, quantity in
its discretion." The same interpretation was made in the case regarding
exclusive supply of movies involving Toho and Shin Toho. 38 Also, this
interpretation of "substantial restriction on competition" seems to be used in
the application of article 3 to price-fixing agreements among competitors, a
32 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, arts. 3, 2 para. 6.
33 Id arts. 3, 2 para. 5.
34 Id art. 10.
35 Id art. 13.
36 Id art. 15.
37 Id arL 16.
38 Judgment of Sept. 19, 1951 (Toho Motion Pictures Production Co. v. FTC), Tokyo Kisai [High
Court], 4 K6minshii 497.
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type of activity different from mergers, according to the conceptual
interpretation rule.
Early decisions of the Japanese FTC regarding price-fixing
agreements among competitors contain no reference to the market position
of participants to the agreements until the mid-1950s, and the prohibition of
"unreasonable restraints of trade" in article 3 was applied, in addition to
article 6, to international vertical agreements between two parties.
Considering this application of law, we may conclude that, in those days,
the degree of effect on the competition considered to be sufficient to
constitute a "substantial restriction of competition" under article 3 was
almost the same as that required by former article 4. Some time after 1955,
however, FTC decisions 39 regarding violations of article 3 included
descriptions of the market position of the participants to the agreements.
Such descriptions of market position continue to appear in Japanese FTC
decisions to the present. It is not clear, however, whether these descriptions
merely explain the circumstances of the violations or whether participant
market position is a factor for determining that an activity constitutes a
violation as an "unreasonable restraints of trade in a particular field of
trade."
In another application of the term, article 8 paragraph 1(1) prohibits
trade associations from substantially restricting competition in a particular
field of trade. However, in a decision of October of 1957 regarding a
violation by the Home Electric Products' Stability Association,40 the FTC
applied article 8 paragraph 1(4), instead of 1(1), to agreements on the resale
price maintenance of the home electric products among large
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Paragraph 1(4) restricts only the
entrepreneurs that participate in the association, not the association as a
whole which is restricted by paragraph 1(1). Moreover, paragraph 1(4) was
also applied to price-fixing agreements among retailers that participated in
the Osaka Kikkoman Association, which had a 31 percent share in the total
soy sauce product market in the Osaka area.4 1 In light of such practice, it
appears that, since 1955, the FTC has deemed horizontal price fixing
39 Oil Products Bid Rigging Case, Judgment of Dec. 1, 1955 (Nihon Sekiyu K.K.), FTC [decision]
no. 1, 1953, 7 Shinketsushii 70; affid, Judgment of Feb. 9, 1956 (Nihon Sekiyu K.K. v. Kasei Torihiki
I'inkai), Tokyo Kasai [High Court], 7 Gy6shii 2849; Methanol Price Agreement Case, Judgment of Jan.
30, 1956.
40 Judgment of Oct. 17, 1957 (In re Home Electric Products Stability Association), FTC
[recommendation] no. 5, 9 Shinketsushil 10.
41 Osaka Kikkoman Association Case, Judgment of Aug. 10, 1968, FTC [decision].
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agreements to constitute "unreasonable restraints of trade" when the
participants have the power to control the market and such agreements
significantly affect competition in the market.
In contrast, United States, European, and German competition laws
provide that such horizontal price-fixing agreements are illegal in principle
without examining the effects on the market.

Only the Japanese

Antimonopoly Law has been interpreted restrictively. The requirement that
a restriction of competition be "substantial in a particular field of trade" can
be interpreted differently depending on the type of activity.42 Horizontal
price-fixing agreements can be viewed by their nature to contain the
Thus, such
participants' intention to eliminate price competition.
and
of
competition,
function
agreements themselves substantially affect the
thereby constitute a "substantial restriction on competition." Such an
interpretation is appropriate to the purposes of the Antimonopoly Law.
However, an interpretation which provides that agreements to eliminate
price competition between two companies may be legal, while those among
three or more companies are illegal, is vague and leads to confusion among
firms when they consider compliance with the laws. Such an interpretation
significantly diminishes the effectiveness of the Antimonopoly Law. On the
other hand, such an interpretation is appropriate if the purpose of the law is
to regulate mergers intended to rationalize business operations by
examining their effects on markets and competition.
6.

"Contraryto the PublicInterest"

The Sherman Act does not contain the term "contrary to the public
interest," found in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law's definition of
"unreasonable restraint of trade" for article 3.43 There have been several
interpretations of this term "contrary to the public interest." If the phrase
were to be interpreted broadly, in the same manner as "public welfare" in
the Constitution, or if it were interpreted in relation to the nation's economy
as a whole, anticompetitive agreements would not be prohibited in
principle. Instead, they would be regulated when they are shown to be
harmful. Since its early days, however, the Japanese FTC has construed
42 See IMAMURA SHIGEKAZU, DOKUSEN KINSHI HO [ANTIMONOPOLY LAW] 62 (1978); TANSO
AINoTU, DOKKINHO JO NO 'KYOSO NO JISSHITSUTEKI SEIGEN' NO I GI TO SONO SEIKAKU [MEANING AND
CHARACTER OF 'SUBSTANTIAL RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION' OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW] 541 (1980);

lyori, I Mei no torihikisupranote 23, at 190.
43 See Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 6.
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"public interest" in light of the objectives of the Antimonopoly Law. These
objectives include the maintenance of fair and free competition. 4
Moreover, the Japanese FTC has deemed anticompetitive agreements to be
prohibited in principle and has applied article 3 to all anticompetitive
agreements. Most scholars support this interpretation in principle. On the
other hand, industrial circles and industrial ministries oppose it.
In a 1984 criminal case involving an oil products price cartel, the
Supreme Court of Japan held that in principle, subject to some reservations,
the term "contrary to the public interest" means violation of the economic
order for free competition that is the primary interest protected by the
Antimonopoly Law.45 Because the Japanese FTC's enforcement of article 3
will continue according to its traditional interpretation, further discussion of
this issue is unnecessary.
Substantially, this interpretation is not
significantly different from that applied to U.S. law.
D.

Keiretsu

Under U.S. antitrust laws, trade agreements within production
keiretsu, as exemplified by continuing trade agreements between
automobile manufacturers and automobile parts manufacturers, have been
treated as "non-price restrictive agreements" (hikakaku seigen kyjtei). At
least since the 1977 Sylvania decision, U.S. courts have applied a "rule of
reason" test to such agreements rather than finding them "per se illegal"
(tizen ih no gensoku). Thus, where trading within keiretsu is concerned, it

is necessary to examine present and future benefits and harms to
competition and the market in order to ascertain whether the harms
outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, because trading within keiretsu varies
from industry to industry, and within the same industry from business to
business, and because the harms and benefits differ among various keiretsu,
it is necessary for courts to judge them on a case-by-case basis.
Under Japan's Antimonopoly Law, the evaluation of trading within
keiretsu is about the same as under U.S. antitrust laws. In the July 1991
Guidelines Relating to Distribution and Trading Practices, the FTC adopted
a fairly strict stance with respect to trading within keiretsu:
44 Plywood Bidding Agreement Case, supranote 10; Soy Sauce Price Agreement Case, supra note
10.
45 Oil Product Price Agreement Case, Judgment of Feb. 24, 1984 (Idemitsu K6san K.K. v. Kuni),
Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 235 Saibanshii 1.
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Where an enterprise (jigydsha), in order to ensure continuation
of an existing trading relationship, agrees with a trading partner
to respect and give precedence to an existing trading
relationship, or in concert with another enterprise engages in an
act excluding competitors, the competition for acquisition of
customers is restricted, market entry of new competitors is
hindered, and competition in the market is restricted.
Furthermore, where an enterprise makes trading with a trading
partner conditional upon the trading partner not dealing with
the enterprise's competitors, or pressures its trading partners
not to deal with its competitors, it exerts a harmful influence on
competition in the market, such as hindering market entry.46
Agreements which give precedence to existing relationships are
treated as violations of article 3 of the Antimonopoly Law,47 while
agreements which make trading conditional upon not dealing with
competitors are treated as an unfair trade practice in violation of article 19.48
Furthermore, reciprocal dealing between a business and its trading partners
is to be considered an unfair trade practice under article 19. Also, the Law
to Prevent Late Payments to Subcontractors (shitauke daikin shiharai
chiento b~shi h5), which supplements the Antimonopoly Law, covers the
problem of abuse of superior position in continuing trading agreements. 49
These provisions have had the effect of improving the keiretsu
situation (as seen in the distribution system of automobile parts), but two
problems should be noted in continuing trade agreements within keiretsu.
These problems arise from the role of what is essentially a Japanese custom.
Continuing trade agreements generally have set terms of one to three years,
and although they commonly contain provisions allowing for automatic
renewal, they can be terminated at the end of the term. If, at the expiration
of the term, the parties were able to freely and reasonably make a decision
about whether to continue with the same trading partners, there would be no
keiretsu problem. But in fact, given the Japanese sense of duty and
humaneness with sympathy to the weak (giri ninjif) and the custom of
46 FTC, GUIDELINES RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION AND TRADING PRACTICES pt. 1-1 (1991).

47 Id pts. 1-1, 2.
48 Id pL 1-4.
49 Id pt. 1-6.
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giving precedence to existing relationships, it is difficult to terminate a
continuing trade agreement upon its expiration. Furthermore, if one party
tries to terminate an ongoing trade agreement that has continued over many
years and the other party objects, a court may decide that the attempted
termination is invalid unless there are significant circumstances favoring
termination. Moreover, even if there is a violation of the terms of the
contract, a court may find that an attempted termination is invalid, and
decide in favor of maintaining the existing order. 50 Because the sense of
duty and humaneness is strong in Japan, in order to break up keiretsu,
businesses must be allowed a free and rational choice of trading partners at
the expiration of continuing trade agreements.
Furthermore, Japanese trade associations are well established in
various industrial fields. These associations are backed by government
ministries. 51
Associations have been formed of keiretsu members,
particularly supplier-manufacturer keiretsu such as Nissan Supplier's
Association.
Under U.S. law, freedom and equality are basically respected.
Discrimination in trade is not allowed. Although there were strong protests
from some, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibiting price discrimination
features treble-damage actions as its central enforcement mechanism.
Under the current regime, discriminatory prices cannot be set. On paper,
Japan's Antimonopoly Law is essentially patterned after U.S. antitrust laws.
From the beginning, there have been provisions restricting discriminatory
pricing. These provisions, however, have never been enforced. The
Guidelines published by the FTC in July 1991 state that aggregated rebates
(ruishin-teki-na ribeeto), in one sense, can promote price formation based
on the true state of the market, but where the percentage of rebate is
significantly high, it can function to cause the products of the company
offering the rebate to be treated more favorably than the products of other
companies." Thus, so long as the percentage is not remarkably high,
50 In Fujiki v. Shiseido Sales (Sept. 27, 1993), in which Shiseido terminated a contract because of
breach of a termination clause by Fujiki, the Tokyo District Court held: 1)that the one-year contract
between the plaintiffand the defendant had continued for a long term of 28 years by virtue of an automatic
renewal clause, 2) that it was thus reasonable that the plaintiff expected the contract to be continued in the
future, and 3) that this expectation should be protected. The court further held that, as the agency contract
in issue was a so-called 'continuous supplying contract', even if there were a unilateral termination clause,
the contract would not be terminated unilaterally, unless there was an extraordinarily changed condition or
grave disloyal conduct by another party. This decision, however, was overruled by the Tokyo High Court
on Sept. 14, 1994.
51 Cf.FTC, REPORT ON TRADE ASSOCIATION (Spring 1993).
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aggregated rebates to promote sales are reasonable. Furthermore, there are
no provisions regulating discriminatory pricing by large-scale businesses.
Such discriminatory pricing practices have the effect of excluding
competition (haita-teki-nakrka o motsu), make the market non-opaque and

complicated, and restrict free competition. Article 1 of the GATT, the
charter of free trade, sets out the most-favored nation principle and adopts
the principle of nondiscrimination. Considering that free trade and
nondiscriminatory treatment are really two sides of the same coin, and that
the concepts of "duty and humaneness" (giri ninj5), along with respect for
the existing order in Japan, are at the bottom of a variety of unfair trade
practices including keiretsu, it is necessary to thoroughly implement the
principle of nondiscrimination and to eliminate ambiguities in order to
abolish unfair trading practices.
E.

Measures Taken Against Violations ofAntitrust Laws

1.

Administrative Cease andDesist Orders (haijosochi) and Surcharges
(kachokin seido)

Although the procedures differ under both U.S. and Japanese law, all
antitrust law violations are subject to cease and desist orders. 52 But these
administrative measures are insufficient to combat violations of the
Antimonopoly Law such as price cartels. Such operations are conducted in
secret, and they cease as soon as they are detected.
In order to eliminate the incentives for cartel formation, Japan
introduced a surcharge system (kachrkin seido) in the 1977 revision of the
Antimonopoly Law.53 Under this system, the government collects
excessive profits from price cartels. The amount of the surcharge is
determined by multiplying the total sales of the product which was the
object of the price cartel over the period the cartel was in effect by a
specified ratio. 54 This levy on excess profits is not a fine and is unique to
Japan. It cannot be found in U.S. law, and the German version, the
Geldbusse, is actually a form of administrative fine.55 Nevertheless, the
52 Sherman Act, supranote 3, art. 4; Clayton Act, supra note 4, art. 15; Federal Trade Commission
Act, ch. 311, art. 5(a)(2), 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)); Antimonopoly Law,
supra note 2, art. 7.
53 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 7-2.
54 Id

55 The German Cartel Law Article 37B (Mehrerltisabschbphung). Cf art. 38 (Geldbusse).
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surcharge has been criticized as being ineffective against elusive price
cartels. By its nature, the surcharge merely deprives the cartel of its profit
and does not provide an effective punitive sanction upon discovery of such
cartels. It has been suggested that it will be necessary to adopt additional
sanctions, including harsh penal provisions, to achieve a preventative effect.
2.

CriminalPenalties

In both the U.S. and Japan, the law has long provided for criminal
penalties, applicable both to natural and juristic persons, for price cartels
and other violations of antitrust law.5 6 In Japan, criminal investigations are
57
initiated after an accusation (kokuhatsu) by the Fair Trade Commission.
In the U.S., antitrust criminal proceedings became common in the 1960s,
and in recent years, approximately seventy to eighty criminal cases a year
have been prosecuted for clearly illegal acts such as price cartels.
In Japan, until the early 1970s, the thought with respect to violations
of the Antimonopoly Law was that eliminating the illegal act was sufficient.
Therefore, violations were handled by administrative cease and desist
orders. But as price cartels sprouted up during the oil shocks of the 1970s, a
general need was perceived to strengthen the preventative power of the
Antimonopoly Law. Thus, in 1974 several oil companies were criminally
charged with forming a price cartel. Following the introduction of the
surcharge system in 1977, however, no criminal charges were initiated for a
long time. Japan's lackluster enforcement of its Antimonopoly Law was
criticized in the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative talks. As a
result, in June 1990, the Fair Trade Commission announced its intention to
aggressively pursue cases of bad-faith violations of the Antimonopoly Law
such as formation of price cartels. The chief public prosecutor (kenji socho)
also made clear his intention to aggressively pursue violations of the Antimonopoly Law. Following this, in 1992, the upper-limit for fines assessed
on corporate offenders was increased from five million yen to one hundred
million yen. Also, by 1993, two criminal charges had been filed for
58
Antimonopoly Law violations.

56 Clayton Act, supra note 4, art. 4; Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 89.
57 Antimonopoly Law, supranote 2, art. 96.
58 Accusation against Stretch Film Price Agreement (Dec. 1992); Accusation against Special Seal
Bid Rigging (Spring 1993).
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Suits for Damages

Under both U.S. and Japanese law, those who suffer injury resulting
from violations of antitrust laws can file suit for damages. In the U.S.,
plaintiffs can demand treble damages, 59 and can file class-action suits.
Furthermore, under the 1976 revision of the Clayton Act, a state's attorney
general can file suit for damages on behalf or the citizens of the state, under
their parens patriae authority. 60 Where there has been a final decision by
the court that an act is in violation of the antitrust laws, such decision serves
as prima facie evidence of a violation. 61 Furthermore, where there is a
likelihood that a private person may be damaged by an act in violation of
62
antitrust laws, he or she may file suit to enjoin the act.
In Japan, a person who has suffered damage due to a violation of the
Antimonopoly Law may file suit under article 709 of the Civil Code's
general provision governing torts (fuho koi). Additionally, one may file suit
where there has been a final decision (kakutei shinketsu) by the Fair Trade
Commission with respect to an act in violation of the Antimonopoly Law.
Under article 25 of the Antimonopoly Law, a person can file a suit for
damages without having to prove negligence (mukashitsu songai baisho
seiky shosh6). Suits for damages which result from violations of the
Antimonopoly Law, however, have been extremely rare. Between 1947 and
April of 1990, only seven cases were brought under article 25 of the
Antimonopoly Law, and only nine cases were filed under article 709 of the
Civil Code, bringing the total to sixteen cases. Moreover, none of the
plaintiffs won their suit. They lost in twelve, settled in two, and withdrew
in one. In May 1991, to assist plaintiffs, and to eliminate violations of the
Antimonopoly Law, the Japanese FTC announced its intention to make evidentiary materials available to courts, where necessary, in suits for damages
caused by violations of the Antimonopoly Law. However, Japan does not
have a discovery system like the U.S., and as the court in an adversarial
system must remain neutral, it continues to be very difficult for plaintiffs to
prove violations of the Antimonopoly Law and the resulting damages.

59 Clayton Act, supra note 4, art. 4.
60 Id arts. 3,4(c).

61 Id art. 5.
62 Id art. 16.
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Organizationsthat Enforce Antitrust Laws

Another factor influencing antitrust enforcement in Japan is the
number of agencies and personnel allocated to the effort. In the U.S., two
public agency organizations enforce federal antitrust laws: the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. The
Justice Department's Antitrust Division has a staff of approximately 600
persons, which is significantly greater than either the criminal or civil
divisions of the Department. Most of the staff members are involved in
Where necessary, the Justice
handling violations of antitrust laws.
prosecutors
from the Federal Bureau of
Department can also employ federal
Investigation. The Federal Trade Commission has approximately 1000 staff
members. In addition, the attorney generals of the states and other selfgoverning territories may file suit to enjoin violations of federal antitrust
laws. 63 The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department can initiate grand
jury investigations in the case of suspected criminal violations, and in civil
investigations, has the right to conduct compulsory searches (kyasei ch5sa
ken). The Federal Trade Commission also has the right to conduct
compulsory searches. Interference with compulsory searches or failure to
comply with searches is punishable by strict criminal penalties, which are
frequently employed. In addition to federal antitrust laws, states have and
enforce their own antitrust laws.
In the EU, the Directorate for Competition (kyjsd s8kyoku), the organ
of the EU Commission (EU i'inkai) responsible for competition law,
employs approximately 400 staff members. Where violations of antitrust
laws are suspected, the EU Commission may conduct compulsory searches
on its own initiative. 64 Those who fail to cooperate in an investigation are
subject to administrative fines. Furthermore, each of the fifteen member
states of the EU has governmental agencies responsible for the enforcement
of competition law. The EU may order these agencies to investigate
suspected violations 65. In Germany, for example, the Federal Cartel Office
(Renpi karuteru tyo), has more than 300 staff members, and when
necessary, they may obtain the cooperation of the police. Additionally,
each German state has its own cartel bureau.

63 Id. art. 16.
64 Council Regulation No. 17, art 1 I(14)-(16), 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87.

65 Id. art. 13.
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In Japan, the Japanese FTC is the only organ responsible for
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. The FTC employs approximately
500 staff members, but only about 200 are directly involved in the
investigation of violations. Under the National Public Servant Law (kokka
komuin h5), the status of the Secretary-General of the FTC is one step
(ichidankai) lower than that of Vice Minister (jikan) of the various
Ministries. Therefore, the power of the FTC to influence and restrain
industry behavior through administrative guidance is weaker than that of the
ministries which govern industry. Only after the FTC has filed criminal
charges (keiji kokuhatsu) will the Prosecutor's Office initiate a criminal
investigation. The Prosecutor's Office has no special division for the
Antimonopoly violations. While the FTC does have the authority to
conduct compulsory investigations,6 6 and while obstruction of investigation
is a crime, there have been no prosecutions for obstruction of FTC
investigations (chasa bdgaizai). Local governments have no enforcement
authority under the Antimonopoly Law. In sum, the enforcement regime in
67
Japan is clearly weak when compared to that of the U.S. and the EU.
G.

Issues Related to Antitrust Laws

Market entry is an issue closely related to antitrust law, and several
issues related to market entry can be included within the broad meaning of
competition policy. Hence, a brief comparison of the U.S. and Japan with
respect to some of these issues is in order here. Yet, in the future, a more
detailed and precise comparison of these and similar points will be
necessary.
1.

GovernmentRegulation andIndustrialPolicy

It is clear that government regulation and industrial policy have the
effect of directly, or indirectly, restricting competition. There is a
significant difference between government regulations and the industrial
policies of the United States and Japan. I think this difference is partly
attributable to differences in the social, economic, and historical
backgrounds of the two countries, and to differences in the business66 Antimonopoly Law, supranote 2, arts. 46, 94.
67 Cf Hotta Tsutomu, Zenekon oshoku ni kosureba konzetsu dekiru [Scandals in General
ConstructionFieldcan be Terminatedby this Means], CHOO KORON (Jan., 1994).
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government relationship. These differences influence the competitive
environment and the ease of market entry. Thus, from the viewpoint of
market access, it is necessary to level out (hejunka) certain differences in
government regulations and industrial policy in the same manner as
antitrust laws. Some of these issues have already been the topic of
discussion between the U.S. and Japan.
2.

Law andInformationRelating to its Application and Enforcement

In the U.S., the federal government files more than one hundred
antitrust violation cases per year. In addition, more than six hundred private
suits are filed annually. Because a large number of decisions are handed
down each year, there is an abundance of specific information about the
application and interpretation of antitrust laws. There is a well-developed
legal information industry, and it is easy to obtain explanations of the
application and interpretation of antitrust laws. In short, the status of the
law is clear (timeiseiga takai).

In the EU, decisions of the EU Commission in antitrust law cases
contain detailed findings of fact and application of laws. Furthermore, the
European Court decides more than ten cases per year. In turn, these
decisions include in depth discussions of EU Commission decisions. As in
the U.S., there is a wealth of well-organized legal information. In both the
U.S. and the EU, fairly specific opinion letters are published answering
hypothetical questions about antitrust laws. In addition, there is a mutual
exchange of legal information relating to antitrust laws between the EU and
the U.S. Thus, there is practically no information gap between the two
regimes.
In Japan, the FTC has begun to issue about thirty decisions a year
involving violations of the Antimonopoly Law, but most have been
recommendation decisions (kankoku shinketsu) issued with the consent of
the respondent.
These contain only a brief summary of the facts
constituting the violation and the applicable statutes. Although one may be
able to understand what provision will apply in what situations (hdritsuno
unydjrky8), one cannot understand from them the interpretation of the law
as applied to specific facts. Furthermore, since 1947, there have been fewer
than thirty Tokyo High Court cases involving review of FTC decisions,
fewer than thirty suits for damages stemming from Antimonopoly Law
violations, and only six cases involving criminal violations of the
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Antimonopoly Law. As a result, there is a dearth of legal information about
the Antimonopoly Law, and what information is available is not very clear.
This analysis probably holds true not only for the Antimonopoly Law, but
also for other regulatory laws administered by government ministries in
Japan. In part, this state of affairs may be attributable to the relationship in
Japan between the government bureaucracy and the people. It is not clear to
what extent the recently enacted Administrative Procedure Law (Gy5sei
tetsuzuki hd) will improve this situation, but it is possible that the lack of
legal information relating to the application and interpretation of the
Antimonopoly Law will become a source of friction between Japan and
other countries. To a certain extent, this point is being discussed in the
Structural Impediments Initiative.
3.

On the Legal System's Treatment of Suitsfor Damages

With regard to the issue of the legal system's treatment of private
suits, it is important to consider both substantive and procedural laws. In
the U.S. it is easy to sue, and there are many suits. In Japan, it is difficult to
sue, and there are few suits. During the Structural Impediments Initiative
discussions, both the small number of suits for damages related to violations
of the Antimonopoly Law and the difficulty of pursuing suits were
highlighted in connection with the issue of the enforcement of the
Antimonopoly Law. Also, the high cost to plaintiffs of filing suits 68 and the
difficulties faced by plaintiff in procuring evidentiary materials were
pointed out. Some of these issues have been partly resolved. However, with
respect to the method of obtaining evidence, it will be necessary to
investigate the possibility of introducing some kind of discovery system.
The system of civil suits must be improved, not only as a means for
strengthening the enforcement of laws and for increasing the amount of
legal information available, but also as an important means for ensuring
rights.69
68 The cost of filing a court suit in Japan was calculated at 0.5 percent of the requested damages. In
the Yokosuka Navy Base Construction Bid Rigging Damage Case, the U.S. Government requested 5
billion yen in damages. It found the cost of filing to be unreasonable and requested the Japanese
Government to revise the calculation. As a result, the cost was reduced by more than half.
69 With respect to this issue, the U.S. delegation commented:
We welcome that the JFTC has taken administrative steps designed to facilitate private damage
claims, but these actions will not be sufficient in themselves to achieve the GOJ undertaking to
establish an effective antimonopoly remedy damage system. Broader initiatives are needed. We
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CONCLUSION

Japan's Antimonopoly Law was modeled on U.S. antitrust laws, and
is basically similar to them. However, because of differences in the
cultural, social, economic, and legal backgrounds of the two countries, it is
clear that the Antimonopoly Law of today has become considerably
different from U.S. antitrust laws. These differences have led to differing
competitive environments (kyjs63 j5ken). This, in turn, has surfaced as a
structural problem in U.S.-Japan trade relations, particularly with respect to
the opening of markets. 70 These types of problems do not exist only
between the U.S. and Japan. It is possible that systematic harmonization of
competitive environments (kyt5s j6ken no seid5-teki-na heijunka) among
countries will develop into an issue in the post-Uruguay-round era.
For Japan, market access is an important problem, and thus Japan
should strictly enforce its Antimonopoly Law against price cartels and
collusive bidding. Because price cartels and collusive bidding are acts
conducted in secret, it is necessary to adopt stringent sanctions and apply
the laws strictly in order to achieve a general preventative effect. In order to
effectively eliminate violations of the Antimonopoly Law, price cartels
must be treated as being clearly in violation of the law. This illegal status
will cause business persons to reassess their lax attitude toward price cartels
and make it easier for them to strictly comply with the Antimonopoly Law
in their companies' best interests. While the FTC has already made clear in
its 1991 Guidelines that vertical restraints of trade could be included within
"unreasonable restraints of competition," it remains necessary to
demonstrate that this interpretation will actually be applied. It is necessary
to recognize that clarifying the interpretation and application of the law will
greatly increase its effectiveness. From this standpoint, it is important for
FTC decisions to be specific and detailed in their application of the statutes
appreciate that the Ministry of Justice has committed to complete a study on the possible
reduction in the filing fees for private damage actions as soon as possible. It has not yet decided
to take action to reduce these fees. Nor has the Ministry of Justice agreed to study other
obstacles to an effective private remedy system. Without legislative changes, including such

measures as providing plaintiffs with effective means to obtain evidence needed to pursue their
claims, shifting the burden of proving damages and causation, multiple damages, some form of
class actions and reduced filing fees, barriers to successful pursuit of private damage remedies

will continue to prevent victims of AMA violations from obtaining compensation.
SII Follow-up Report, May 1991.
70 See C. FRED BERGSTEN, RECONCILIATED DIFFERENCES?
CONFLICT (1993).
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to each case. It is also necessary for the FTC to investigate and report on
keiretsu. Furthermore, it is critical that the FTC be expanded and its powers
strengthened, and for local govemments to become involved in
enforcement. In addition to improved application and enforcement of the
Antimonopoly Law, it is necessary for the government to relax restrictive
regulations, to clarify industrial policy, and to limit and clarify
As for administrative guidance, the future
administrative guidance.
application of the Administrative Procedure Law will be important. From a
more basic and long-term perspective, it will be necessary for government
ministries to make available more and better information relating to the
interpretation and application of laws, to make suits challenging
administrative dispositions easier, and to adopt measures promoting private
suits where appropriate.

